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Abstract
Experimental and empirical evidence documents instances where the presence of an
inferior option in a menu increases the attractiveness of the better options from that menu
and thus distorts the normative ranking across menus. We analyze the case when besides
this so called context e¤ects bias there is also a concern for exibility in the spirit of
the literature initiated by Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001). Since
the context e¤ects bias and the desire for exibility both increase the inclination of a
decision maker to choose larger menus, the analysis allows the disentangling of the e¤ect
of the behavioral bias from the e¤ect of the rational desire from exibility. We nd a weak
condition on the set of ex post preferences under which the two e¤ects are identiable.
We show that our representation is essentially unique. From a pedagogical viewpoint,
our paper provides a novel methodology of identifying probabilities on the state space
of subjective uncertainty introduced by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) when this
state space is innite. This method renders the innite state space essentially nite with
respect to a certain salient property.
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1 Introduction
Numerous observations from the marketing and psychology literature document the existence of
a so called context-e¤ects bias as suggested by the following experiment presented in Simonson
and Tversky (1992). The participants in the experiment were asked to choose between two
substitute products, tissues and towels. Two versions of the experiment were designed. One
superior brand of towels and one superior brand of tissues were included in both versions. In
addition, in one version of the experiment the participants were o¤ered with one inferior brand
of towels, while in the other they were o¤ered with one inferior brand of tissues. The results
of the experiment showed that the market share of the superior quality brand was signicantly
higher when the inferior quality brand belonged to the same category. This example shows
how the presence of an inferior option in a menu may make the better bundles of that menu
appear more attractive by comparison, and thus distort the normative ranking of the available
options.1 This is a pattern of behavior inconsistent with the standard model of rationality,
which posits that products which are never chosen for consumption should not inuence the
decision makers choices.
In a recent paper, Barbos (2010) studies a model of choice from categories, or menus,
consistent with the above experimental evidence. Since menus are the objects of choice that
reveal an individuals desire for exibility, as a natural extension of the certainty model whose
axiomatic foundations are provided in that paper, we study here the case when besides the
context-e¤ects bias, there is also a concern for exibility in the spirit of the literature initiated
by Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR(2001)). More
precisely, we analyze the case in which we allow for the presence of some underlying uncertainty
between the moment of the choice of the menu and the moment of the choice of a specic option
from within the menu. Allowing for uncertainty between the two stages makes sense especially
in those applications in which there is some cost of switching between menus and the choice of
the specic element from the menu is made either signicantly later or repeatedly over a long
period of time. In these cases, when choosing the menu the decision maker has to contemplate
various potential realizations of his future preferences and thus, the usual intuition behind the
notion of subjective tastes (Kreps (1979), DLR (2001)) applies here as well.2 Since both the
context e¤ects bias and the desire for exibility increase the inclination of a decision maker
to choose a particular menu when that menu is expanded, the analysis in this paper allows
disentangling the e¤ect of the behavioral bias from the e¤ect of the rational desire for exibility
1There are numerous similar observations in the psychology and experimental literature. See for instance
Bhargava, Kim and Srivastava (2000), Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) or Pan, OCurry and Pitts (1995).
2Alternatively, one can think of this model as a study of the behavioral implications of a reference point bias
in the model of subjective uncertainty introduced by DLR (2001).
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in evaluating preferences over menus. We show that our representation is essentially unique.
As a motivating example, consider a family that contemplates buying a hybrid car. Before
going to the dealership, the husband uses the internet to check the available options presented
by the two leading brands, Toyota Prius and Honda Insight. He nds out that the Prius comes
in three trims, which we denote by x0, x1 and x2, while the Insight comes in just one trim,
denoted by y. If the husband were to evaluate these options in isolation, he would have the
following normative preference: y  x2  x1  x0. However, in line with the Simonson and
Tversky experiment, assume that the husband exhibits a context e¤ects bias. In particular,
assume that the behavioral bias induces the following ranking of categories:3
fx2; x0g  fyg  fx1; x0g  fx2g  fx1g  fx0g (1)
Here, following the denition and interpretation of categories from Barbos (2010), we write for
instance fx2; x0g  fyg  fx2g  fx0g to mean that the individual would choose x2 if he were
presented with the set of options x0, x2 and y, where x0, x2 belong to the same category, but
would choose y if the inferior option x0 was not present.
Given the ranking in (1), the individual should choose to go to the Toyota dealership and
the family would purchase the option x2. However, the husband is aware that once in the
dealership, the wife will become interested in the decision process, will virtually impose her will
and the family will purchase the car that she prefers. The husband is sure that his wife will not
be interested in x0, but is unsure as to which option she would prefer out of x1 and x2. Given
the husbands ranking fx2; x0g  fyg  fx1; x0g, his ranking of the categories fx2; x1; x0g and
fyg will depend on the particular subjective belief that he has about the events that the wife
would choose x1 or x2. In this case, it makes sense thus to see the initial selection of a dealership
as a choice between menus and the subsequent selection of a trim as a choice from the menu
after some uncertainty is resolved. Thus, if one regards the household as an economic agent,
introducing uncertainty in a model that attempts to describe its behavior is necessary.45
3For instance, x0 might o¤er a few additional features at a signicant premium over x1 and x2. This could
induce the husband the feeling that by buying either of these two latter options, he is making a good deal.
4Note that upon observing the ranking fx2; x1; x0g  fx2; x0g  fyg  fx1; x0g  fx2; x1g  fx2g  fx1g 
fx0g, one can conclude that context e¤ects bias is what induces the family to purchase a Toyota hybrid. On the
other hand, if one observes fx2; x1; x0g  fx2; x1g  fyg  fx2; x0g  fx2g  fx1; x0g  fx1g  fx0g, then the
consumer exhibits no behavioral bias and the purchase of a Prius would be induced by the desire for exibility.
However, upon observing fx2; x1; x0g  fyg  fx2; x1g  fx2; x0g  fx1; x0g  fx2g  fx1g  fx0g, it is likely
that both the desire for exibility and the behavioral bias play a role in inducing the nal purchase and a more
careful analysis is required to identify precisely the contribution of each e¤ect to the nal decision.
5We employed here the multiple selves interpretation of time varying preferences (see, for instance, Chatterjee
and Krishna (2009b) for another example) to make the argument slightly more straightforward. It is clear though
that the story would not lose signicant relevance if the husband was the one that made the nal selection, but
he was not sure which of the two options x1 and x2 he prefers until after visiting the dealership.
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For this model, following Kreps (1979), we will identify a menu with an ex ante observable
action that after some subjective uncertainty is resolved will make a certain set of outcomes
available ex post. The observability of these ex ante actions renders the preference over menus
a revealed preference; thus, we can take this to be our primitive in the uncertainty setting. The
reference dependent representation under uncertainty that we will axiomatize is the following:
V (A) =
Z
S

max
z2A
U(z; s)

(ds)  min
x2A
Z
S
U(x; s)(ds)

(2)
where S is a state space capturing the subjective uncertainty with  a positive measure over
S, U(z; s) is the ex post state utility of option z in state s and  2 (0; 1) is a parameter
that measures the strength of the behavioral bias.6 The space S will satisfy an additional
condition that will specify that the decision maker does not reverse or almost reverse his ex
ante preferences. Thus, while we allow for the presence of uncertainty, we do restrict attention
to those applications in which there exists some underlying phenomenon that makes the ex
ante preferences relevant for the ex post stage. The behavioral bias is identiable only in those
applications in which this condition is satised. We study the behavioral implications of both
a nite and an innite state space S. An innite state space appears, for instance, in models in
which the individual has a continuous distribution of the ex post tastes over the characteristics
of the available options.
Now, it is straightforward to see that (2) can be written as:
V (A) = (1  )
Z
S

max
z2A
U(z; s)

(ds) + 
Z
S

max
z2A
U(z; s)  U(x0; s)

(ds) (3)
where x0 = argmin
z2A
Z
S
U(z; s)(ds) (4)
Thus, the preference for a menu is determined by the combination of a normative component
and a behavioral bias component. The normative component is the weighted average of the
utilities of the normatively best options from the menu in each of the possible ex post states.
The weighting factors are the subjective probabilities of these states. The bias component is
the weighted average of the di¤erence in utilities between the normatively ex post best options
6Note that the reference point is the ex ante least preferred option from within the menu. An alternative
generalization of the certainty representation in Barbos (2010), would have a reference point bias for each state.
In this case, the utility of a menu would be the weighted sum of the di¤erences between the utilities of the ex
post best and ex post worst options in each state. While this would be an interesting model to axiomatize, as
the car buying example provided above suggests, the context e¤ects bias distorts choice at the menu selection
stage. It is therefore more compelling to consider that the agent compares the ex post better options with the
option that is the least preferred when the behavioral bias a¤ects choice. Ultimately, though, the only way one
can identify which model characterizes an agents behavioral in a particular application is by testing which set
of axioms are consistent with his choices. This paper provides a test for the representation dened in (2).
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in the menu and the normatively ex ante worst element in the menu, x0. The second component
is a measure of the increase in the relative attractiveness of the better options from a menu
generated by the presence of the inferior option against which they are compared.
We show that the main axiom that captures the departure from rationality in the certainty
model from Barbos(2010) is almost su¢ cient to deliver the context e¤ects representation under
uncertainty when added to the standard axioms from DLR (2001). More precisely, the axiom is
su¢ cient for the case of a nite state space. When the state space is innite, for the behavioral
bias to be identiable, an additional axiom is required. This axiom imposes the existence of a
pair consisting of a menu A and a lottery y such that y does not provide any ex post exibility
to a decision maker that was faced initially with the menu A. This axiom is equivalent to the
condition that the decision maker does not reverse or almost reverse his ex ante preferences.
Under this assumption, the e¤ect of the behavioral bias can then be measured by studying
the e¤ect of expanding the menu A with the lottery y. As the ex post preferences are not
observable, the existence of this pair is imposed through some ex ante behavioral implications.7
Finally, from a pedagogical point of view, our paper contributes to the literature by providing
an original method of identifying probabilities on the state space of subjective uncertainty
introduced by DLR (2001) when this state space is innite. This method uses the compactness
property of the state space to construct a nite cover of this space. For the proof of su¢ ciency
of the axioms, the cover is constructed so that an element of strictly positive measure with
some desired properties can be extracted. For the proof of necessity of the axioms, which in
the case of our representation is not trivial, we construct the cover so that we can partition the
state space into a nite number of subsets with states sharing a common property. Essentially,
this method renders the innite state space nite with respect to a certain condition and thus
allows employing the argument from the case of a nite state space. To our knowledge, Sarver
(2008) is only one other axiomatic exercise in the literature on preferences over menus to put
structure on the subjective state space derived by DLR (2001) when the state space is innite.8
Preferences over menus were considered for the rst time by Kreps (1979). He identied an
act with the choice of a set of future options out of which at a later stage the decision maker
chooses his most preferred element. He interpreted the agents preference for the exibility
o¤ered by the menu as being generated by some underlying subjective uncertainty that will
be resolved between the moment when the choice of the menu is made and the moment when
the choice from the menu is made. This allowed him to show that under su¢ ciently weak
conditions, the decision maker behaves as if the uncertainty were described by a subjective
7When the state space is nite, the pair (A; y) always exists and thus this additional axiom is not necessary.
8Chatterejee and Krishna (2009a) present in a non-axiomatic setting other methods amenable for use in a
model with an innite state space of subjective uncertainty.
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state space, where each state is identied with an ex post subjective utility. The preferences
that we study in this paper belong to the class of preferences modeled by DLR (2001). DLR
(2001) considered menus of lotteries instead of menus of deterministic bundles; this allowed
restricting the ex post state utilities to be of the expected utility form. This addressed the issue
of the nonuniqueness of the subjective state space characteristic to the Kreps representation.
Also, unlike Kreps(1979), DLR (2001) allowed for subjective states of negative measure to
capture not only a preference for exibility but also a preference for commitment. There is
a large body of literature that built on the class of preferences introduced by DLR (2001).
Gul and Pesendorfer(2001) were the rst to give meaning to the abstract subjective states
derived in earlier papers. Thus, they imposed conditions on preferences such that the resulting
state space consists of one state of negative measure representing a temptation preference
and one state of positive measure representing the second period preferences which combine
a normative preference and the temptation preference. This combination of normative and
temptation preferences has been implemented in the meantime in other papers to model various
behavioral biases, such as non-bayesian updating, cognitive dissonance, etc. For examples, see
Epstein and Kopylov (2007) or Kopylov and Noor (2009). In another direction, the preference
for commitment has been interpreted in Sarver(2008) not as being driven by the presence of
temptation but by the anticipation of regret.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic assumptions
common to most of the literature on preferences over menus. Also, in Section 2 we dene the
representation in our model and compare it with other representations that built on the DLR
(2001) framework. In section 3 we present our additional axioms and the main results which
state the equivalence between the axioms and the representations, while section 4 concludes
the paper. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Framework and the Representations
Let Z be a nite space of outcomes or prizes and let (Z) denote the set of probability
measures on Z endowed with the topology of convergence in distribution. Let K((Z)) denote
the collection of all nonempty closed subsets of (Z). Endowing K((Z)) with the Hausdor¤
topology we make it a compact metric space. Elements of (Z) will be called lotteries and will
be denoted by x; y; z; etc., while the typical elements K((Z)) will be called menus and will be
denoted by A;B;C; etc. The decision maker is assumed to have a revealed preference relation
 over the elements in K((Z)). For any two menus A;B 2 K((Z)) and any  2 [0; 1],
dene their convex combination as A+ (1  )B  fz 2 (Z) : z = x+ (1  )y, for some
x 2 A and y 2 Bg. To avoid complicating the exposition to address the uninteresting case in
6
which  is trivial, we assume that there exist x; y 2 (Z) such that fxg  fyg.
We will impose throughout the paper the following standard axioms on the preference. For
a detailed interpretation and motivation of these axioms, see DLR(2001).
Axiom 1 (Weak Order).  is a complete and transitive binary relation.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For any A 2 K((Z)), the upper and lower contour sets, fB 2
K((Z)) : B  Ag and fB 2 K((Z)) : B  Ag, are closed in the Hausdor¤ metric topology.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all A;B;C 2 K((Z)) and any  2 (0; 1), A  B implies
A+ (1  )C  B + (1  )C.
The representation in (2) is a particular case of the additive expected utility representation
as dened and axiomatized for the rst time by DLR (2001). We will also frequently refer to it
throughout as the DLR representation.
Denition 4 An additive expected utility representation of  is a nonempty possibly
innite set S, a state dependent utility function U : (Z)  S ! R and a nitely additive
signed Borel measure  on S, such that V : K((Z))! R, dened for all A 2 K((Z)) by
V (A) =
Z
S

max
z2A
U(z; s)

(ds) (5)
is continuous and represents  and each U(; s) is an expected utility function in that for each
s 2 S there exists us : Z ! R such that U(z; s) = z  us.
Following DLR (2001), we allow for the uncertainty to be completely subjective. Thus,
besides allowing for a subjective distribution over the ex post contingencies as in standard
Savage type models, we also allow for the actual space of ex post contingencies to be subjective.
See DLR (2001) for further details. Therefore, a state in the above representation can be
uniquely identied by the corresponding ex post state utility.
For the case when the state space S is nite the representation can be equivalently written
as:
V (A) =
X
s2S

max
z2A
U(z; s)

(s) =
X
s2S+

max
z2A
us(z)

 
X
s2S 

max
z2A
us(z)

(6)
where S+  fs 2 S : (s) > 0g and S   fs 2 S : (s) < 0g and us()  j(s)jU(; s). In
writing the above we used the fact that the measure over states and the state utility are not
separately identied in models of state-dependent utility, so they can be combined together.
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Note that the above denition allows the measure  over the states to be signed. DLR
(2001) call positive states and negative states, the states in the support of the positively signed
and respectively negatively signed components of .9 Intuitively, as stated in DLR (2001), the
positive states would reveal the agents desire for exibility, while the negative states would
reveal his desire for commitment. In our paper, unlike the other papers building on the DLR
(2001) framework, the agent is assumed to not have any kind of commitment issues. Therefore
we assume throughout an additional axiom on preferences called Monotonicity, which imposes
that weakly larger sets in the partial order given by inclusion be weakly preferred by the decision
maker.10 This is a condition consistent with the assumption of the agent not experiencing
commitment problems.
Axiom 5 (Monotonicity). For all A;B 2 K((Z)) with A  B, we have B  A.
DLR (2001) and Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini and Sarver(2007) prove the following result.
Theorem 6 When the set Z is nite, the preference  has an additive expected utility rep-
resentation with a measure  which is always positive if and only if it satises Weak Order,
Independence, Continuity, and Monotonicity.
The e¤ects of imposing Monotonicity on preferences are the following. Firstly, the axiom
insures that the measure over the states from the representation is everywhere positive. Sec-
ondly, it allows us to obtain a stronger property of the measure, that is -additivity instead
of nite additivity as in DLR (2001). Finally, Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini and Sarver (2007)
show that if Monotonicity is not imposed, the Continuity axiom as presented above needs to
be strenghtened to an axiom which they call Strong Continuity in order to get the additive
expected utility representation with a signed measure. The additional condition on preferences
that is needed delivers the Lipschitz continuity of the representation. Here, since we do assume
Monotonicity, we may impose the weaker continuity condition given by the Continuity axiom
presented above.
We will also consider the case when the state space from the DLR representation is nite.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition to obtain a nite state space was found in Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichini (2009). The authors call this additional axiom Finiteness.11
9Chatterejee and Krishna (2009a) present conditions that characterize the sign of a state in in terms of its
representation as an integral with respect to a signed measure and show that in the case of an innite state
space, a state can be both positive and negative.
10The Monotonicity axiom is part of the axiomatization of the preference for exibility in Kreps (1979).
11hull(A) = fz 2 Z : z =Pki=1 izi with i  0,Pki=1 i = 1 and zi 2 Ag denotes the convex hull of a set A.
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Axiom 7 (Finiteness) Every menu A 2 K((Z)) has a nite critical set, where a critical
set of a menu A is a any set A0 such that for all B with A0  hull(B)  hull(A) we have
B  A.
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) prove the following result.
Theorem 8 When the set Z is nite, the preference  has an additive expected utility repre-
sentation with a measure  which is always positive and with a nite state space S if and only
if it satises Weak Order, Independence, Continuity, Monotonicity and Finiteness.
The Reference Dependent Representation under Uncertainty
The specics of the representation from DLR (2001) require a number of normalizations. First,
as explained in DLR (2001) the state space is just an index set that allows reference to di¤erent
ex post preferences. Moreover, the ex post state utilities which are assumed to be of the
expected utility form are identied only up to a¢ ne transformations, so we follow the approach
in DLR (2001) and restrict the state space S to the set of normalized utilities
SN 
n
s 2 RN :
XN
k=1
sk = 0 and
XN
k=1
(sk)2 = 1
o
: (7)
Throughout the rest of the paper we use s 2 SN to refer both to a second period contingency
as well as to the normalized expected utility function representing the preferences in that
state. Thus, the utility of x 2 (Z) in state s will be U(x; s) = x  s =
XN
k=1
xksk, where
s = (s1; :::; sN) 2 SN is the normalized expected utility function that represents the state s
preferences. Note now that the restrictions of the Weak Order, Continuity and Independence
axioms to (Z) imply by standard results the existence of an expected utility function v()
that represents the restriction of  to (Z). Sarver(2008) shows that since SN contains the
normalization of any a¢ ne function on (Z), there exists s 2 SN and  > 0 such that
v(x) = 
XN
k=1
xksk for all x 2 (Z).12
We dene now formally a normalized representation of the preferences exhibiting the refer-
ence point bias. As mentioned in the Introduction, we assume that in the second period, after
the uncertainty is resolved the decision maker cannot reverse or almost reverse his ex ante tastes.
Denote the ball of radius " around s where " > 0 and s 2 S by N"(s)  fs0 2 S : d(s0; s) < "g
where d(; ) is the usual Euclidean metric in RN .
12The nontriviality of  ensures that  > 0.
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Denition 9 Let Z be any nite set. A normalized reference-dependent representation
under uncertainty of  consists of a nonempty possibly innite measurable set S  SN , a
Borel measure  on SN , with S being the unique support13 of  and a constant  2 (0; 1), such
that
(i) V : K((Z))! R, dened for all A 2 K((Z)) by
V (A) =
Z
S

max
z2A
(z  s)

(ds)  min
x2A
Z
S
(x  s)(ds)

(8)
represents the preference  ;
(ii) the utility of a lottery x 2 (Z) in state s 2 S is x  s;
(iii) if s 2 SN is the normalized utility that represents the restriction of  to (Z) then
there exists " > 0 such that S  SNnN"( s).14
We emphasize that besides S and  which are the usual elements in a normalized DLR
representation, the parameter  and the restriction (iii) on the set of ex post utility functions
will also be deduced from preference as a part of the representation.
Note that the functional form in (8) for V () can be rewritten as:
V (A) =
Z
S

max
z2A
(z  s)

(ds) + max
x2A


 
Z
S
(x  s)(ds)

; (9)
and thus our representation is indeed a particular form of an additive expected utility repre-
sentation with all states having associated a positive measure. The condition (iii) on the set
of ex post utilities allows identication of the behavioral bias modeled by our representation
with the reference point bias. Note that (8) implies that the ex ante preferences over singletons
are represented by the utility function v(x)  (1   )
Z
S
(x  s)(ds). By inspecting (9), it is
clear that the preferences represented by v (x)   
Z
S
(x  s)(ds) could constitute just another
ex post state in a DLR(2001) framework with the property that these ex post preferences are
exactly the reverse of the ex ante preferences over singletons. We rule out this possibility by
making the arguably reasonable assumption that in the second period, after the uncertainty is
resolved, the decision maker cannot reverse or almost reverse his ex ante tastes. This is done
13The support of a Borel -additive measure , if it exists, is a closed set, denoted S, satisfying: (1) (Sc) = 0;
and (2) If G is open and G\S 6= ?, then (G\S) > 0. Theorem 10.13 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) shows
that if the underlying topological space on which  is dened is second countable or if  is tight, then  has a
(unique) support. In our case, SN is clearly second countable, so the denition is correct.
14When the state space is nite, condition (iii) can be written as  s =2 S. Also, note that  s 2 SN .
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by the identication of the term max
x2A


 
Z
S
(x  s)(ds)

from the equivalent representation in
(9) with the impact of a reference-point bias and by the condition (iii) from Denition 9.
In the remaining of this Section we present the particular structure imposed on the ex post
states of the DLR representation by various papers that built on that framework to underline
the di¤erences between these representations and ours.15 Note rstly from (9) that in our model
there exist no negative states and there exists one positive state of strictly positive measure
having the corresponding utility a negative a¢ ne transformation of the utilities of the rest of
the states.
In Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) the equivalent DLR representation is the following:
V (A) = max
x2A
u1(x) max
y2A
u2(y) (10)
where u1 is the utility that represents the second period preference relation and u2 is the
temptation component of these second period preferences. Therefore, in this representation
there is one positive state and one negative state with no particular mathematical relation
between them.
In Sarver (2008) the equivalent DLR representation of his regret representation is:
V (A) = max
z2A

(1 +K)
Z
S
U(z; s)(ds)

 
Z
S

max
x2A
KU(x; s)

(ds) (11)
where K  0. Thus, in this case there is a number, possibly innite of negative states and
one positive state whose corresponding state utility is a positive a¢ ne transformation of the
utilities corresponding to the negative states.16
The equivalent representation from Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) of what they call
the temptation representation is:
V (A) =
X
s2S

max
z2A
U(z; s)

(s) 
X
s2S
X
j2Js

max
y2A
U(y; j)

(s) (12)
which is a generalization of the one from Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) in the sense that it assumes
multiple ex post states and for each ex post state multiple ex post temptations. This represen-
15We emphasize that the actual representation from each of the papers is di¤erent from that presented here as
being its equivalent DLR representation in order to capture the corresponding behavioral trait that is analyzed
in each paper.
16The regret representation as dened in Sarver (2008) has the Borel measure  positive. However, as
mentioned in that paper as well, the equivalent DLR representation is signed and has a negative component.
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tation has a number of positive states and for each positive state a number of corresponding
negative states with some underlying structure among them. Unlike the other representations,
in Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) the state space is assumed to be nite.
3 The Axioms and the Main Results
As noted before, the representation in (8) is a special type of an additive expected utility repre-
sentation with a positive measure. Thus, it will be necessary that the preference satisfy Weak
Order, Continuity, Independence and Monotonicity. Two additional axioms will be su¢ cient
for the preference  to have a reference-dependent representation when combined with the
above four axioms. The rst additional axiom captures the departure from the standard model
of rationality that we study in this paper.
Axiom 10 (CEB: Context-E¤ects Bias) : For any pair (A; x) 2 K((Z)) (Z), such
that fyg  fxg for all y 2 A, we have A [ fxg  A.
Axiom CEB states that if the decision maker has the set of possible choices A expanded by
adding an option, say a singleton fxg, which from an ex ante point of view is strictly worse
that the rest of the elements in the menu, then the agent will strictly prefer the new expanded
set A[fxg to the initial one A. The motivation for this preference is given by the fact that the
inferior lottery x will be chosen as the new reference point and thus the overall attractiveness
of the better options from the menu will increase. Note that since the preferences in the text
of the axiom are strict, Axiom CEB imposes that the agent has a strict preference for menus
having additional strictly inferior outcomes. This corresponds to the restriction that  > 0 in
the representation in (8).
Axiom CEB provides the departure from the standard model of rationality as suggested
by the presence of a behavioral bias. However, when allowing for an innite state space this
departure is identied only when combined with the Axiom CEB-2 presented below. This is
because, when allowing for the presence of uncertainty, it may happen that an ex ante inferior
option still provides some ex post exibility to the elements of a set, and thus the pattern of
choice suggested by Axiom CEB is valid without assuming any reference point bias. In order
to have a departure from the standard rational preferences, there must exist at least one set
A and at least one lottery y strictly worse from an ex ante point of view to all elements of A
such that in any ex post state there exists an element in A that is at least as preferred as y.
Then, imposing Axiom CEB to the sets A and A [ fyg would provide the departure. Now,
in the case of a nite state space, the pair (A; y) with the desired properties always exists
12
when we maintain the assumption that the second period preferences cannot be exactly the
reversed ex ante preferences.17 In the case of an innite state space, the existence of such a pair
(A; y) will be imposed by Axiom CEB-2 below. As the ex post preferences are not observable,
this is done by imposing a natural implication of the existence of the pair (A; y) on the ex
ante preferences. Before presenting Axiom CEB-2 we will make a remark that suggests that
imposing axiomatically the existence of such a pair is correct when the preferences that we are
studying are represented by a utility function as in (8).
Remark 11 When the preferences  admit a normalized reference-dependent representation
as in (8), there exist a set A 2 K((Z)) with A  int((Z)) and a lottery y 2 (Z) such
that: (i) for any x 2 A we have x  s > y  s and (ii) for any s 2 S there exists x 2 A such
that x  s > y  s.
Proof. See Appendix A1 for some notation on support functionals and then Lemma 29.
The second non standard axiom for the case of an innite subjective state space is the
following.
Axiom 12 (CEB-2): There exists a set A 2 K((Z)) with A  int((Z)) and a set B 2
K((Z)) with A  B and fxg  fyg for all x 2 A and some y 2 B, such that for all lotteries
z 2 (Z) with fyg  fzg for all y 2 B, we have B [ fzg  A [ fzg.
To see the motivation for this axiom, consider a pair fA; yg such that y does not provide any
ex post exibility to A. Then, on the one hand, by choice of y, it provides no ex post exibility
to the set A [ fzg. On the other, since y is weakly preferred to z from an ex ante point of
view, y will not be the reference point chosen from A [ fy; zg. Since under no circumstances
the agent would choose y over the elements in A [ fzg, he is as well o¤ having at hand the
menu A [ fzg as he is having the larger menu A [ fy; zg. Therefore, we impose the required
indi¤erence. The condition that B is some superset of A instead of A [ fyg is a nonessential
weakening of the axiom meant only to simplify the notation in the proof of the main theorem
when we characterize a menu by the corresponding support functionals.
We mention that while the condition from the text of the axiom is valid for an innite
number of sets in K((Z)), we do not impose this condition to hold for all these sets simply
because there may exist A 2 K((Z)) such that there exists no lottery y =2 A that does
not provide any ex post exibility to A. Also, we do not impose the indi¤erence of the sets
17See the necessity part of the proof of Theorem 14 below for a formal argument.
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constructed as in the text of Axiom CEB-2, but for all B that contain a lottery y such that y
is strictly less preferred to all elements of A from the ex ante point of view. This is because, as
mentioned earlier, a lottery which is ex ante inferior to all x 2 A could turn out ex post to be
better to all elements of A and then B [ fzg  A [ fzg. The weak restriction imposed in the
text of the Axiom that the condition is valid for at least one pair (A;B) is su¢ cient to obtain
the desired representation for all sets due to the additional structure provided by the EU form
of the ex post utilities. Note also that we impose that an element of B be strictly worse than
all elements of A. Without this condition, it is clear that the axiom would not have any bite
since we could always let B be exactly the set A.
Now we are ready to state the main result of the paper:
Theorem 13 The preference  has a representation as in (8) if and only if it satises Weak
Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2.
Proof. See Appendix A1 and Appendix A2.
While the complete proof of Theorem 13 can be found in the Appendix, we present here for
intuition a sketch of this proof. We start by showing how the argument goes if the state space S
were nite. This reveals how Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 work to give us the representation.
Weak Order, Continuity, Independence and Monotonicity imply that the preference over
menus has the following representation, with  a positive measure:
V (A) =
X
s2S

max
z2A
(z  s)

(s), for all A 2 K((Z)) (13)
Denote by v() the restriction of V () to singletons. Thus, v represents the ex ante preference
over lotteries and by (13) we have: v(z) =
X
s2S
(z  s)(s), for all z 2 (Z). Moreover, as
claimed in Section 2, since v is an a¢ ne function, there exists s 2 SN , such that v(z) =
(z  s) for all z 2 (Z). Now, recall that the representation in (8) is a particular case
of a DLR representation in which the utility associated with one of the states is a negative
a¢ ne transformation of the utilities associated with the rest of the states. We will prove here
that under Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2, the representation in (13) must have exactly that
structure on the ex post states, which comes down to showing that  s 2 S. The rest of the
proof consists of showing that given that structure, the representation in (13) can be written as
in (8). This second part of the proof is just simple algebra manipulations and its presentation
is relegated to the Appendix.
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Let A 2 int(K((Z))) and B 2 K((Z)) be as in the denition of Axiom CEB-2, that is
A  B and fxg  fyg for all x 2 A and some y 2 B. Then by Axiom CEB and Monotonicity
we have B  A; using the representation in (13) it follows that:
X
s2S

max
x2B
(x  s)

(s) >
X
s2S

max
x2A
(x  s)

(s): (14)
Since the measure  is positive, (14) implies that there must exist s0 2 S such thatmax
x2B
(x  s0) >
max
x2A
(x  s0). Denote the strict lower contour sets associated with an expected utility function
s and a lottery y 2 (Z) by Ls(y)  fx 2 (Z) : x  s < y  sg. Then, given the linearity of
the utility functions, a state utility s will be a negative a¢ ne transformation of s if and only
if Ls(y) \ Ls(y) = ? for all y 2 (Z). Assume by contradiction that there is no such state
utility as the one that we are looking for, that is Ls(y) \ Ls(y) 6= ? for all s 2 S. We show
that in this case, if Axiom CEB holds then Axiom CEB-2 must be violated.
Take some y 2 B such that xs  ys for all x 2 B and then some z 2 Ls0(y)\Ls(y) which
is nonempty by the contradiction assumption. Then, since y 2 B we will havemax
x2B
(x  s0) > z s0
so max
x2B[fzg
(x  s0) = max
x2B
(x  s0) > max

max
x2A
(x  s0) ; z  s0

= max
x2A[fzg
(x  s0): Therefore:
V (B [ fzg) =
X
s2Snfs0g

max
x2B[fzg
(x  s)

(s) + (s0) max
x2B[fzg
(x  s0) >
X
s2Snfs0g

max
x2B[fzg
(x  s)

(s) + (s0) max
x2A[fzg
(x  s0) 
X
s2Snfs0g

max
x2A[fzg
(x  s)

(s) + (s0) max
x2A[fzg
(x  s0) = V (A [ fzg):
Therefore, V (B [ fzg) > V (A [ fzg) so there exists z with x  s > z  s for all x 2 B such
that B [ fzg  A [ fzg which violates Axiom CEB-2 as claimed. In conclusion, there must
exist a state s 2 S that is a negative a¢ ne transformation of s.
Proving the necessity of Axiom CEB is straightforward. To see that Axiom CEB-2 must
also be satised when the preferences can be represented as in (8) with a nite state space,
take some lottery y 2 int((Z)) and for each s 2 S, take xs 2 Hs(y) \ L s(y) \(Z), where
Hs(y)  fx 2 (Z) : x  s = y  sg. Let A  [s2Sxs and B  A [ fyg. Then, by the choice of
the set A, we will have fxg  fyg for all x 2 A. On the other hand, for any z 2 Ls(y) [Hs(y)
we have
V (A [ fzg) =
X
s2S

max
w2A[fzg
(w  s)

(ds)   min
w2A[fzg
hX
s2S
(w  s)(ds)
i
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X
s2S

max

max
w2A
(w  s); z  s

(ds)  
hX
s2S
(z  s)(ds)
i
=
X
s2S

max

max
w2B
(w  s); z  s

(ds)   min
w2B[fzg
hX
s2S
(w  s)(ds)
i
= V (B [ fzg):
In the above we used the fact that the restriction of the representation to singletons implies
fxg  fyg , (1  )
X
s2S
(x  s) > (1  )
X
s2S
(x  s) and the fact that since for each s 2 S,
there exists xs 2 A \Hs(y) we have max
w2A[fyg
(w  s) = max
w2A
(w  s).
While in the case of a nite state space, it is su¢ cient to show that  s must be one of the
states from the DLR representation, for the case of an innite state space this is not enough.
This is because the state  s can always be added to the state space and assign a measure
zero. Thus, for the proof of the su¢ ciency of the axioms for the innite state space case, the
main challenges are to show that the DLR measure of  s is strictly positive and to show
the existence of the empty neighborhood of  s. The rst straightforward step in the general
proof is to use Axiom CEB to assert the existence of a set bS1  S with (bS1) > 0, such that
max
x2B
(x  s0) > max
x2A
(x  s0) for all s0 2 bS1 (see Lemma 18). The main goal of the rest of the proof
of su¢ ciency is to construct a set bS5  bS1 with (bS5) > 0 and nd a lottery z 2 (Z), such
that max
x2B
(x  s0) > z  s0 for all s0 2 bS5 and min
x2B
(x  s) > z  s. Then, an argument similar to
the one from the case of a nite state space will complete the proof by showing that Axiom
CEB-2 must be violated.
Now, note the following fact.
Fact: If \s2fs1;:::;sngLs(y) 6= ? and
 \s2fs1;:::;sngLs(y) \ Lsn+1(y) = ? for some y 2 (Z),
then sn+1 2 hull( s1; :::; sn).
Thus, if we could nd a set of N   1 linearly independent ex post states in bS1with:
(int (hull(fs1; :::; sN 1g))) > 0 (15)
we could then rst argue inductively using the above Fact that:
\s2fs1;:::;sN 1gLs(y) 6= ? (16)
(see Lemma 25) and then also argue that \s2hull(fs1;:::;sN 1g)Ls(y) 6= ? (see Lemma 26). In
addition, if we ensure that:
s =2 hull(f s1; :::; sN 1g) (17)
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then again by the above Fact, we would also have that
 \s2fs1;:::;sN 1gLs(y) \ Ls(y) 6= ? and
thus be able to take:
z 2  \s2hull(fs1;:::;sN 1g)Ls(y) \ Ls(y) (18)
Finally, by letting: bS5  hull(fs1; :::; sN 1g) (19)
and selecting z as above, we would achieve the desired result. However, there are two problems
with this approach that do not allow the argument to go through as stated. Firstly, since Axiom
CEB-2 does not state the existence of a lottery y, but of a set B, the above mentioned Fact is
not true if we replace y with the set B. Secondly, since SN is the subset of normalized utilities,
ndingN 1 linearly independent values with the desired properties is not immediately obvious,
if possible at all.
In order to solve the rst issue, we will expand the set (Z) to the smallest a¢ ne set that
contains it, that is to 
  fz 2 RN : PNi=1 zi = 1g. Then, by dening the expanded lower
contour sets Ls(B)  fy 2 
 : y s < z s for all z 2 Bg, we will be able to prove a counterpart of
the above Fact (see Lemma 24). While in the end, we will obtain an element z0 that belongs to
the intersection of these expanded sets
 \s2bS5Ls(B)\Ls(B) (see Lemma 26), since (Z) has
a non empty algebraic interior in 
, we will be able to select a lottery z 2 (Z) that will have
the desired properties (see rst Lemma 17 to see why we may consider without loss of generality
that B  int((Z)) in the text of Axiom CEB-2 and then Lemma 27).18 To solve the second
problem, we will expand the set of ex post utilities from the normalized set SN to the set PN =n
s 2 RN :
XN
k=1
sk = 0
o
. A rst e¤ect of this expansion is that the counterpart of the above
Fact will have now to be written in terms of convex cones instead of convex hulls (see Lemma
24). But since z0 2  \s2fs1;:::;sN 1gLs(B)\Ls(B) still implies z0 2  \s2cone(fs1;:::;sN 1g)Ls(B)\
Ls(B) the argument will continue to go through (see Lemma 26). Therefore, we need to nd
N   1 linearly independent utilities in PN such that (int (cone(fs1; :::; sN 1g)) \ bS1) > 0
and s =2 cone(f s1; :::; sN 1g). Then, by letting bS5  int (cone(fs1; :::; sN 1g))\ bS1 and z be
selected as explained above we would complete the argument. We mention here that considering
N   1 linearly independent states that would include  s would not solve the problem because
then the interior of the cone generated by less than N  1 states in the N  1 dimensional space
PN would be empty and thus of zero measure. Therefore, the need for the more elaborate
construction.
Now, using the contradiction assumption (f sg) = 0, we show in Lemma 19 and Lemma
20 that there exists a set bS2  bS1 such that (bS2) > 0 and  s =2 conebS2. Next, Lemma 21
18Note that while z0 2

\s2bS5Ls(B)

\Ls(B), z will satisfy only the weaker set of properties max
x2B
(x  s0) >
z  s0 for all s0 2 bS5 and z 2 Ls(B). As argued above, this is su¢ cient to obtain the desired result.
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and Lemma 22 show that there exists a set bS3  bS2 and  > 0 such that s =2 cone([s2bS3N (s)),
where N (s) is the closed ball of radius  around s. In Lemma 23 we construct the set of
linearly independent utilities fs1; :::; sNg with the properties presented above. This is done
by covering the compact set bS3 with a nite partition extracted from a cover of bS3 whose
elements are the intersections of this set bS3 with the convex cones generated for each s 2bS3 by some set of N   1 linearly independent utilities fss1; :::; ssN 1g with the property that
s 2 int  cone  fss1; :::; ssN 1g. In addition, since  s is su¢ ciently far away from the set
cone([s2bS3N (s)), as ensured in the Lemma 22, we will have s =2 cone(f s1; :::; sN 1g). The
proof of the existence of the empty neighborhood around  s is presented in Theorem 28.
It di¤ers from the proof of the fact that (f sg) > 0 only in the way in which it uses the
contradiction assumption in the proof of Lemma 19 as a rst step in the construction of the setbS2. We will present in the Appendix only the part of the argument in which the two proofs are
di¤erent.
The necessity part of the proof of Theorem 13 also needs a rather elaborate approach. This
is because the innite set [s2Sxs, with xs chosen as in the intuitive argument presented above, is
not necessarily closed and thus not necessarily compact. Thus, we need to take A = cl([s2Sxs).
But then the fact that we select xs 2 L s(y) for each s 2 S does not necessarily imply
fxg  fyg for all x 2 A and this invalidates the required conclusion. Part (iii) of the Denition
9 will help overcome this problem but the construction is still not straightforward. The proof
of the necessity will share some steps which are similar to steps from the proof of Theorem
16 and those steps will be presented without proof in the Appendix. However, we emphasize
here that while in both proofs the initial steps consist of partitioning some compact set of
ex post states into a nite number of subsets such that the states contained in each subset
share some common properties, there is an important di¤erence in terms of the ultimate goal
of these arguments. Thus, in the proof of Theorem 16, which is the result that shows that
(f sg) > 0, the partitioning of bS1 was done so that we could in the end claim that one of
these subsets, namely bS5, must be of strictly positive measure since the measure of the set bS1
was strictly positive. In the proof of the necessity of Axiom CEB-2, the goal is to partition the
set SNnN"( s) into a nite number of subsets, each sharing some common relevant properties,
so that we can resolve the problems raised by the inniteness of the state space. We defer the
presentation of the argument to the Appendix.19
19A natural question is whether the rather sophisticated proof employed for the case of an innite state space
is indeed necessary. The interested reader is encouraged to nd rst a simpler proof for the necessity of the
axioms, in particular of Axiom CEB-2 because in most other axiomatic exercise, the necessity part is relatively
straightforward. The fact that the necessity part of the proof is not at all straightforward, but in fact requires
quite sophisticated arguments suggests that the same approach is most likely needed for the su¢ ciency part.
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Next, we present an additional result that constitutes the representation theorem for the
case of a nite ex post state space of uncertainty. As argued above, in this case the restriction
on preferences given by Axiom CEB-2 is not necessary. To prove the theorem below, it is
enough to show that by replacing Axiom CEB-2 with Finiteness, the resulting set of axioms
imply Axiom CEB-2. Then the argument from the sketch of the proof of Theorem 13 would
complete the proof. Showing that Axiom CEB-2 must be satised in this case can be done by
following an argument close to the one used above as the intuitive proof of Theorem 13 for the
nite case.
Theorem 14 The preference  has a representation as in (8) with a nite state space if
and only if it satises Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and
Finiteness.
We close this section with a result that states the uniqueness of the representation for the
uncertainty model. This result is important because it allows the interpretation the objects
of the representation as intended. Thus, the fact that the parameters of the representation
are identied ensures that when observing choice, it is feasible to disentangle the impact on
behavior of the context e¤ects from the impact of the presence of subjective uncertainty.
Our representation in (8) is identied by the elements of the set (; ) where  is a probability
over the SN and  measures the strength of the behavioral bias. The following theorem shows
that both  and  are identied from preferences.
Theorem 15 Suppose that (1; 1) is a normalized representation of some preferences  sat-
isfying Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2.
Then, if (2; 2) is also a normalized representation of  we must have 1 = 2 and 1 = 2.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies a model of reference-dependent preferences over menus of lotteries. We
extend the model of choices from categories in Barbos (2010) to allow for the presence of some
underlying subjective uncertainty between the moment of the choice of a menu and the time
a specic option within the menu is selected. The axiomatic foundations of this model allow
for the disentangling of the context e¤ects bias from the rational desire from exibility that
is usually captured by preferences over menus. We identify a weak condition on the set of ex
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post preferences under which the two e¤ects are distinguishable from each other. We nd the
behavioral implications of both a nite and an innite space of uncertainty. We also provide
a new method for putting structure on the set of probabilities on the state space of subjective
uncertainty introduced by DLR (2001) when this state space is innite, by making it essentially
nite with respect to a certain property.
Appendix
A1. Construction of the state space for the uncertainty model
We present here briey the construction of the state space from Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
(2001) as we will utilize the concepts introduced there extensively in the rest of the proof.
Firstly, as shown in DLR (2001) under Weak Order, Continuity and Independence any set
of lotteries in (Z) is indi¤erent to its convex hull. Thus, we can restrict attention to the set
of convex sets20 in K((Z)), which we denote from now on with eK((Z)). Recall that the
number of outcomes in Z is denoted by N and that SN is the set of normalized expected utility
functions on (Z). Dene by C(SN) the set of real-valued continuous functions on SN and
endow it with the topology given by the sup-norm metric. Embed eK((Z)) into C(SN) by
identifying each menu with its support function: A ! A, with A(s) = max
x2A
PN
k=1 x
ksk. It is
a standard result that the above mapping is an embedding, one-to-one and monotonic. Thus,
for all A;B 2 eK((Z)), A() = B() implies A = B and A  B implies A  B. The order
used on C(SN) is the usual pointwise partial order. Also the support functional is a¢ ne, that
is: A+(1 )B = A + (1  )B.
Let C denote the subset of C(SN) that  maps eK((Z)) into, that is C  fA 2 C(SN)
: A 2 eK((Z))g. Using this mapping and the Weak Order and Continuity axioms, DLR (2001)
construct the continuous linear functional W : C ! R that represents the preference  overeK((Z)):
W (A)  W (B) if and only if A  B: (20)
As in the main text, dene v : (Z) ! R to be the restriction of W to the set of support
functions of the singleton sets: v(x)  W (fxg). It can be shown using the linearity of the
20Note that
Z
S
U(x; s)(ds) is a linear function in x so even when A is not convex, the minimum ofZ
S
U(x; s)(ds) over A will be attained at an element of A. Thus, the reference point will always belong
to A.
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support functions that v is a¢ ne, that is v(x+ (1  )y) = v(x) + (1  )v(y). In addition,
as mentioned in Section 2, there exists s 2 SN and   0 such that v(x) = 
XN
k=1
xksk for
all x 2 (Z).
Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini and Sarver (2007) show in the proof of their Theorem 2 that
under Monotonicity, the functionalW is increasing on the space H = fr11 r22 : 1; 2 2 C
and 1; 2  0g which is dense in C(SN). Since f  jjf jj  1 for any f 2 H, where 1 is the
function identically equal to 1, by the monotonicity of W we will have W (f)  jjf jjW (1) so W
is bounded on H. Therefore, as in DLR (2001), W can be extended uniquely from C to the
whole C(SN) preserving continuity and linearity. Also, since H is dense in C(SN), it follows
immediately thatW will be monotone on the whole C(SN). As in Royden (1988, page 355), W
can be decomposed as W = W+  W  where W+ and W  are two positive linear functional
forms. Using again the monotonicity of W and the denition of W+ from Royden (1988) it is
straightforward to show that W () =W+() and W () = 0 on C(SN).
Then, W is a positive linear functional on C(SN) so since SN is compact, the functions
in C(SN) have compact support since closed subsets of compact spaces are compact, so the
Riesz-Markov Theorem from Royden (1988, page 352) can be used to writeW (f) as an integral
of f against a -additive positive measure  over SN for any f 2 C(SN). In particular,
W (A) =
Z
SN
A(s)(ds) for any A 2 eK((Z)) (21)
This last step delivers the DLR representation of the preference . However, note that we
use here a di¤erent version of the Riesz Representation Theorem than the one used in DLR
(2001). This is because the Monotonicity Axiom makes the functional W positive and thus we
can obtain a -additive and positive Borel measure as opposed to a nitely additive and signed
measure as in DLR (2001). As it will be seen below, the -additivity of the measure is necessary
both for obtaining our reference-dependent representation as well as for proving the uniqueness
of this representation. Next, we will impose the additional restrictions on preferences given by
Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 to obtain our specic representation from (8).
A2. Proof of Theorem 13
As a rst step in the proof, we will rewrite Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 by using the
support functionals and the functional W instead of the preference relation. Note that since
v(x) represents the preference over lotteries in (Z), using the results from Appendix B1 we
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have:
fxg  fyg , 
NX
k=1
yk( sk)  
NX
k=1
xk( sk), fyg( s)  fxg( s) (22)
Given two sets A;B 2 eK((Z)), if there exists y 2 B such that fxg  fyg for all x 2 A we will
have that fyg( s) > fxg( s) for all x 2 A so B( s) > A( s). Thus, in general
if there exists a lottery in B that is strictly worse than all lotteries in A we can write this in a
compact way as B( s) > A( s). Similarly, if y is weakly worse than all elements in A, we
have B( s)  A( s). Also note that in order for Axiom CEB-2 to hold, more exactly for
a lottery y 2 (Z) to exist such that fxg  fyg for some other x 2 (Z), we need  > 0 since
otherwise all elements in (Z) are indi¤erent to each other. Therefore, under Axiom CEB-2
we have B( s) > A( s) if and only if B( s) > A( s). Finally, for any two support
functionals A; B 2 C, denote their join by A _ B, that is (A _ B)()  max(A(); B())
and note that A[B = A _ B.
Using these results, the fact that A  hull(A) for any A 2 K((Z)) and the fact that
A  B i¤ A  B, we can write Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 in the following equivalent
forms:
Axiom CEB: For any A;B 2 eK((Z)), with A  B such that B( s) > A( s),
we have W (B) > W (A).
Axiom CEB-2: There exists a set A 2 eK((Z)) such that A  int((Z)) and a set
B0 2 eK((Z)) with A  B0 and B0( s) > A( s), such that for all lotteries z 2 (Z)
with fzg( s)  B0( s), we have W (hull(B0[fzg)) =W (hull(A[fzg)).
We introduce now some new notation in addition to the one already presented in Sec-
tion 3. For any set B 2 eK((Z)), denote its expanded weak lower and upper contour sets
corresponding to si 2 PN by: Lsi(B)  fy 2 
 : y  si  z  si for all z 2 Bg and
Usi(B) = fy 2 
 : y  si > z  si for all z 2 Bg. For q 2 (Z) denote the hyperplane
generated by si as: Hsi(q) = fz 2 
 : z  si = q  sig. For any set S of points in PNnf0g, denote
the convex cone and convex hull generated by S with: cone(S)  fs 2 PN : s =Pki=1 isi with
i  0 and si 2 S for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and k 2 Ng and hull(S)  fs 2 PN : s =
Pk
i=1 isi with
i  0;
Pk
i=1 i = 1 and si 2 S for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and k 2 Ng.
Proof of Su¢ ciency in Theorem 13:
We will prove two results, Theorem 16 and Theorem 28, which together will bring us one step
away from obtaining the structure on the state space from the DLR representation necessary
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for writing the representation of W () as in (8).
Theorem 16 Under axioms CEB and Identication we must have (f sg) > 0.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that (f sg) = 0 and take the set set A 2 eK((Z)) given by
the Axiom CEB-2 with A  int((Z)) and the superset B0 2 eK((Z)) of A such that there
exists x 2 B0nA with fxg( s) > A( s). Note that in order for such a set B0 to exist it
must be that  > 0 so we must also have fxg( s) > A( s). We will break up most of the
rest of the proof of Theorem 16 into a series of lemmas.
Lemma 17 There exists a set B 2 eK((Z)) with A  B  B0 \ int((Z)) and B( s) >
A( s). Moreover, under Axiom CEB we have
Z
SN
B(s)(ds) >
Z
SN
A(s)(ds).
Proof. If x 2 int((Z)), then let B  hull(A [ fxg). Since B0 and int((Z)) are convex
and A [ fxg  B0 \ int((Z)), we have hull(A [ fxg)  B0 \ int((Z)). On the other hand,
B( s) = A[fxg( s) = max(fxg( s); A( s)) = fxg( s) > A( s). If x =2 int((Z))
we will nd some x0 2 int((Z)) \ (B0nA) with fx0g( s) > A( s) and then dene B 
hull(A [ fx0g) and repeat the argument above to prove the rst part of the claim. Note that
since A is closed it must be that A( s) = fyg( s) for some y 2 A. Also, since  s 2 SN ,
we have  s 6= 0 so y =2 int(A). Take x0 = 12(x+ y) and note that x0 2 int((Z))\ (B0nA). On
the other hand, by the a¢ ne property of () we have fx0g( s) = 12fxg( s) + 12fyg( s) >
A( s). For the second part of the claim, note that A  B implies A  B and since
B( s) > A( s) we can appeal to Axiom CEB to conclude thatW (B) > W (A): Using the
DLR(2001) representation from (21), this can be rewritten as
Z
SN
B(s)(ds) >
Z
SN
A(s)(ds).

Lemma 18 There exists an open set bS1  SN with (bS1) > 0 and  s 2 bS1 such that B(s) >
A(s) for any s 2 bS1.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 5 in Royden(1988, pp. 82) and Lemma 17. 
Lemma 19 There exists " > 0 such that (bS1ncone(N "( s))) > 0 where N "( s) is the
closed ball of radius " around  s in RN .
Proof. If this were not true we would then have 
bS1nconeN 1
n
( s)

= 0 for all n  1 so:


cone

N 1
n
( s)

\ bS1 = bS1  bS1nconeN 1
n
( s)

> 0 for any n  1. Note that
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n
cone

N 1
n
( s)

\ bS1o is a decreasing sequence of sets with \1n=1 coneN 1
n
( s)

\ bS1 =
cone(f sg) \ bS1. But cone(f sg) = f( s) :   0g and since bS1  SN in which
the utilities are normalized so that
PN
k=1(s
k)2 = 1, we have cone(f sg) \ bS1 = f sg.
So, since 

cone
 
N1( s)
 \ bS1  bS1 < 1 and  is -additive we can use for in-
stance Theorem 9.8(ii) in Aliprantis and Border(1999, pp. 337) to conclude that: (f sg) =
lim
n!1


cone

N 1
n
( s)

\ bS1 = lim
n!1

bS1 > 0 which contradicts the assumption that (f sg) =
0. Thus, the set bS1ncone(N "( s)) will be of strictly positive measure. 
Lemma 20 There exists a set bS2  bS1 such that (bS2) > 0 and  s =2 conebS2.
Proof. Even though s =2 bS1ncone(N "( s)), we cannot yet claim that s =2 cone(bS1ncone(N "( s))).
To obtain a set with this property, we will partition bS2 into 2N 2 elements constructed as follows.
Firstly, note that by the normalization
PN
k=1 s
k = 0 for all s 2 PN , we must have  s  v1 = 0,
where v1  (1; :::; 1) 2 RN . Select next some other N   3 vectors such that fv1; v2; :::; vN 2g is
a linearly independent set and  s  vi = 0, for all i 2 f1; :::; N   2g. Note on the one hand
that choosing N   2 such vectors is possible because the dimension of the underlying space PN
is N   1. On the other hand, since fv1; v2; :::; vN 2g are linearly independent, the dimension of
the set: R  fs 2 PN : s  vi = 0; for i 2 f1; :::; N   2gg is 1. Thus, since  s 2 R, we have
that s 2 R implies s = ( s) for some  2 R.
Let H1  fs 2 PN : s  v1  0g and H2  fs 2 PN : s  v1  0g and then construct
iteratively the following sets: Hi1;:::;in;1  fs 2 Hi1;:::;in : s  vn+1  0g, Hi1;:::;in;2  fs 2 Hi1;:::;in :
s  vn+1  0g for n = f1; :::; N   3g. Let: Si1;:::;iN 2  Hi1;:::;iN 2 \
bS1ncone(N "( s)) for all
fi1; :::; iN 2g 2 f1; 2gN 2. Note that the 2N 2 elements Si1;:::;iN 2 thus constructed form a nite
partition of bS1ncone(N "( s)), so since (bS1ncone(N "( s))) > 0, one of the elements of the
partition which we denote bS2 must be of strict positive measure. Without loss of generality we
may assume that s  vi  0 for all s 2 bS2 and i 2 f1; :::; N   2g. This is because when s  vi  0
for some i we may take v0i =  vi instead of vi and then, except for some notation, the elements
of the partition of bS1ncone(N "( s)) will be the same.
We will show now that  s =2 cone(bS2). Assume by contradiction that this is not true,
that is there exist fs1; :::; smg  bS2 and f1; :::; mg 2 Rm+ such that  s = Pmi=1 jsj. We
may assume without loss of generality that sj 6= s for any j, because when this is not true
we must still be able to write  s as a positive combination of the remaining elements from
fs1; :::; smg. Now, for any i 2 f1; :::; N 2g we have  s vi = 0, sj vi  0 and  s =
Pm
i=1 jsj
imply sj  vi = 0 for all j 2 f1; :::;mg. Therefore, for any j 2 f1; :::;mg, we have sj  vi = 0
for all i 2 f1; :::; N   2g which implies sj 2 R \ SN . But R \ SN = f s; sg because of
the normalization
PN
k=1
 
sk
2
= 1 for the elements in SN and of the fact that s 2 R implies
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s = ( s) for some  2 R. Since sj 6= s we must therefore have sj =  s for all j which is
impossible because  s =2 bS1ncone(N "( s)). This completes the proof of Lemma 20. 
We denote by diam(S)  supfd(s; s0) : s; s0 2 Sg the diameter of a nonempty set.
Lemma 21 There exists a closed set bS3  bS2 such that (bS3) > 0 and diam(bS3)   for some
 < 1
2
.
Proof. Wewill use Theorem 15 from Royden(1988, pp. 63) which states that if E is a measurable
set and " > 0, then there exists a closed set F  E such that (EnF ) < ". Since by Lemma 20
we have (bS2) > 0, there exists " such that (bS2) > " > 0. Applying the result from Royden,
we conclude that there exists a closed set bS4  bS2 such that (bS2nbS4) < ". But since bS4  bS2,
we have: (bS2nbS4) = (bS2)   (bS4) > "   (bS4) from which it follows that (bS4) > 0. Now,
take some  < 1
2
and consider the open cover of bS4 consisting of the sets fN 
2
(s) \ bS4gs2bS4.
Since bS4 is a closed subset of the compact set SN , it is compact so there exists a nite subcover
of bS4. Since (bS4) > 0, one of the elements of the subcover, lets say N 
2
(s) \ bS4, must be of
strict positive measure. Applying again the result from Royden(1988) to the set N 
2
(s) \ bS4,
we conclude that there exists a closed set bS3  bS2 such that (bS3) > 0 and bS3  N 
2
(s) so that
diam(bS3)  diamN 
2
(s)

 . 
Lemma 22 There exists  > 0 such that  s =2 cone([s2bS3N (s)).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the claim is not true so that for any n > 1, we have
 s 2 cone([s2bS3N 12n (s)). Thus, for any n  2, there exist fni ; rni gi2f1;:::;p(n)g with ni > 0
and rni 2 [s2bS3N 12n (s) such that  s =
Pp(n)
i=1 
n
i r
n
i . We rstly claim that it is without loss of
generality to take p(n) = N for all n. To see this, note that:  s = 
Pp(n)
i=1 ir
n
i

, where  Pp(n)
i=1 
n
i

and i  
n
i

. Since
Pp(n)
i=1 i = 1, we have: r
n Pp(n)i=1 irni 2 hull [s2bS3N 12n (s).
By Carathéodorys Convexity Theorem (see for instance Theorem 5.17 from Aliprantis and
Border(1999, pp. 173)) in an (N   1)-dimensional vector space, every vector in the convex hull
of a nonempty set can be written as a convex combination of at most N vectors from that set.
Thus, in our case there exist fni ; rni gi2f1;:::; Ng with ni > 0 and rni 2 [s2bS3N 12n (s) such that
rn =
PN
i=1 
n
i r
n
i . Therefore,  s =
PN
i=1(
n
i )r
n
i as desired.
Now, since bS3 is closed it follows that [s2bS3N 1n (s) is also closed. Moreover, for any rni 2
[s2bS3N 12n (s)  [s2bS3N 14 (s) we have: jjrni jj  jjrni   sjj + jjsjj  54 because jjsjj = 1 when
s 2 SN . Therefore, [s2bS3N 12 (s) is a closed subset of the compact set

s 2 RN : jjsjj  5
4
	
so it
is compact. Since frn1g is a sequence in a compact set, it has a convergent subsequence rni1 ! r01.
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Thus, it is without loss of generality to assume that rn1 ! r01 and then repeating the argument
iteratively we can take rni ! r0i for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng. We claim that r0i 2 bS3 for all i. To see
this, note that if r0i =2 bS3 for some i, since bS3 is closed we will have d(r0i ; bS3) =  > 0. But
then, take M 0 such that for any n  M 0 we have rni 2 N2 (r0i ) and let M  max(M 0; 1) + 1.
Then:  = d(r0i ; bS3)  d(r0i ; rMi ) + d(rMi ; bS3) < 2 + 2 which is impossible so it must be
that r0i 2 bS3 for all i. Next, we show that for any i the real sequence fni g is bounded
so that we can extract some convergent subsequence. Thus, we have  s =
PN
i=1 
n
i r
n
i =PN
i=1 
n
i

rn, for some rn 2 hull

[s2bS3N 12n (s)

. Now, note that since diam(bS3)   we
will have: diam

hull

[s2bS3N 12n (s)

= diam

[s2bS3N 12n (s)

  + 1
n
. Thus, for any r 2
hull

[s2bS3N 12n (s)

we have: jjrjj = d(r; 0)  d(s; 0)  d(r; s)  jjsjj   (+ 1
n
) = (1  1
n
  ) for
any s 2 bS3 and jj   sjj = PNi=1 ni  jjrnjj  PNi=1 ni   1  1n    which since jj   sjj = 1
and ni  0 implies ni  11
2
  . Therefore, repeating the argument from above, we may assume
without loss of generality that ni ! 0i  0 for each i 2 f1; :::; Ng. But then, the sequencePN
i=1 
n
i r
n
i !
PN
i=1 
0
i r
0
i as n ! 1. Therefore,  s =
PN
i=1 
0
i r
0
i with r
0
i 2 bS3 and 0i  0 so
 s 2 cone(bS3) which is a contradiction and thus the proof of Lemma 22 is complete.21 
Lemma 23 There exists a set of N 1 linearly independent utilities22 fs1; :::; sN 1g  PNnf0g
such that (int(cone(fs1; :::; sN 1g)) \ bS3) > 0 and  s =2 cone(fs1; :::; sN 1g).
Proof. For any s 2 PN , denote by s 2 RN 1 the vector consisting of the rst N   1 coordinates
of s. Then, note that
PN 1
i=1 isi = 0 if and only if
PN 1
i=1 isi = 0, so nding N   1 linearly
independent elements in PN is equivalent to nding N  1 linearly independent states in RN 1.
For each i 2 f1; :::; N   1g, let fi  (0; :::; 1; :::; 0) 2 RN 1 with 1 on the ith position and
ei  fi  1N 1(1; :::; 1). It is straightforward to show that fe1; :::; eN 1g is a linearly independent
set in RN 1 so it constitutes a basis for RN 1. For for each i 2 f1; :::; N   1g, let ssi  s+ sei
for some 0 < s < min(; 1), where  is given by Lemma 22 and note that s =
PN 1
i=1
1
N 1s
s
i .
We claim that for any s 2 bS3 we can choose s such that the set fss1; :::; ssN 1g is linearly
independent. For this, we will show that
PN 1
i=1 is
s
i = 0 must imply i = 0 for all i. Since
fe1; :::; eN 1g is a basis in RN 1, s =
PN 1
i=1 
s
iei for some i 2 R. Let  
PN 1
i=1 i and
21Note here that unless we bound p(n) above with N , the argument as presented here does not go through
because it may well be that p(n)!1 as n!1.
22We emphasize here that the set fs1; :::; sN 1g is not required to belong to SN , but to PNnf0g. While we
could adapt Lemma 24 below to conclude that sn+1 2 hull(f s1; :::; sng) and then also adapt the rest of
the proof of Theorem 16 to avoid using cones and work only with states in SN it is not immediately obvious,
if possible at all, in the proof of this Lemma to choose fs1; :::; sN 1g in SN to satisfy the desired properties.
Therefore, the choice to work in the extended state space PNnf0g and use cones instead of convex hulls.
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s PN 1i=1 si and note that
N 1X
i=1
is
s
i =
N 1X
i=1
(si + 
si)ei =

s1 + 
s1   
s + s
N   1 ; :::; 
s
N 1 + 
sN 1   
s + s
N   1

(23)
Setting this equal to 0, we obtain a system ofN 1 equations withN 1 unknowns f1; :::; N 1g,
where the ith equation is:
1(
s
i  
s + s
N   1 ) + :::+ i(
s
i + 
s   
s + s
N   1 ) + :::+ N 1(
s
i  
 + s
N   1) = 0 (24)
We will show now that the (N   1) (N   1) coe¢ cient matrix of this system has a non-zero
determinant D. Thus:
D =

s1 + 
s   s+s
N 1 1   
s+s
N 1 ::: 
s
1   
s+s
N 1
s2   
s+s
N 1 
s
2 + 
s   s+s
N 1 ::: 
s
2   
s+s
N 1
::: ::: ::: :::
sN 1   
s+s
N 1 
s
N 1   
s+s
N 1 ::: 
s
N 1 + 
s   s+s
N 1

=

1 1 ::: 1
s2   
s+s
N 1 
s
2 + 
s   s+s
N 1 ::: 
s
2   
s+s
N 1
::: ::: ::: :::
sN 1   
s+s
N 1 
s
N 1   
s+s
N 1 ::: 
s
N 1 + 
s   s+s
N 1

N   2
N   1(
s + s) =
=
N   2
N   1(
s + s) (s)N 2
For the rst equation, we added rows 2 through N 1 to the rst row and then factored out
the term N 2
N 1(
s+s). For the second equation, we subtracted from each row i 2 f2; :::; N 1g,
the rst row multiplied with si   
s+s
N 1 . Now note that since the only restriction on 
s is
0 < s < min(; 1) we can always select s such that s 6=  s so D 6= 0. Therefore, the
system has a unique solution and since i = 0 for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g solves the system, we
obtain that fss1; :::; ssN 1g is a linearly independent set in RN 1. Then, for each ssi construct:
ssi  (ssi;1; :::; ssi;N 1; (ssi;1+ :::+ ssi;N 1)) 2 PN and we obtained the N  1 linearly independent
states in PN .
We will show now that s 2 int(cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g)), for which since cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g) is
a convex set in an Euclidean space it su¢ ces to show that s 2 al  int(cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g)), the
algebraic interior of the set cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g) in PN . Thus, we will show that for any p 2 PN ,
there exists some s > 0 such that for all  2 [0; s), we have (1 )s+p 2 cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g).
Since fss1; :::; ssN 1g are linearly independent, they form a basis in the N   1 dimensional space
PN so p =
PN
i=1 is
s
i with i 2 R. On the other hand, by construction s =
PN 1
i=1
1
N 1s
s
i so
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(1   )s + p = PN 1i=1  (1  ) 1N 1 + i ssi . Now, by denoting i  (1   ) 1N 1 + i we
will have (1   )s + p = PN 1i=1 i ssi and noting that for  su¢ ciently small i  0 for all
i, the argument is complete. Employing the procedure presented above and using the Axiom
of Choice construct the family of sets: F = fint(cone(fss1; :::; ssNg)) \ bS3 : s 2 bS3g. Since
s  int(cone(fss1; :::; ssNg)) \ bS3 for any s, the elements of F are nonempty and open relative
to bS3. Thus, F is an open cover of bS3 which is compact as a closed subset of the compact
set SN so there exists a nite family F 0  F such that bS3  [
F2F 0
F . Since (bS3) > 0, one of
the elements of F 0 must be of strictly positive measure so (int(cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g))\ bS3) > 0
for some s 2 bS3. Now, since PN 1k=1 ei;k = 0 for all i, where ei;k denotes the kth coordinate
of the vector ei, note that d(ssi ; s) = d(s
s
i ; s) so: d(s
s
i ; s) = jjseijj = s N 2N 1 <  so we have
int(cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g))  int(cone(N (s))). Therefore by Lemma 22 it follows that:  s =2
cone(fss1; :::; ssN 1g). Finally, for any i, jjssi jj = jjs + seijj  jjsjj   jjseijj = 1  s N 2N 1 > 1N 1
implies ssi 6= 0. 
Lemma 24 Let fs1; :::; sng  PNnf0g with n  1 be such that \ni=1Lsi(B) 6= ?. Then, if
sn+1 2 PNnf0g is such that (\ni=1Lsi(B))\Lsn+1(B) = ?, we must have sn+1 2 cone(f s1; :::; sng).
Proof. Note that since B is compact, Lsi(B) = Lsi(zsi) for some lottery zsi 2 B for all
i 2 f1; :::; n + 1g. Moreover, \ni=1Lsi(B)  \ni=1Lsi(q) 6= ? for some q 2 \ni=1Lsi(B) because
for any x 2 \ni=1Lsi(q) and any i 2 f1; :::; ng we will have x  si < q  si  zsi  si. Therefore,
the condition that (\ni=1Lsi(B)) \ Lsn+1(B) = ? implies that (\ni=1Lsi(q)) \ Lsn+1(zn+1) = ?.
Also, q  sn+1 > zn+1  sn+1 because otherwise (\ni=1Lsi(B)) \ Lsn+1(B) 6= ? since all elements
in \ni=1Lsi(q) would be also in Lsn+1(B). We will show now that: Lsn+1(q) \ (\ni=1Lsi(q)) = ?
and to this end, assume by contradiction that there exists some y 2 Lsn+1(q) \ (\ni=1Lsi(q)).
Consider the set: V  fx 2 
 : q + (y   q) for some  > 0g and note for any x 2 V and
i 2 f1; :::; ng, we have x  si < q  si because y  si < q  si. Therefore, V  \ni=1Lsi(q) so to prove
our claim it is enough to show that V \ Lsn+1(zn+1) 6= ?. For this we need to nd some  > 0
such that (q + (y   q))  sn+1 < zn+1  sn+1. Since q  sn+1 > zn+1  sn+1 as stated above and
y 2 Lsn+1(q) by the contradiction assumption, any  > (q z)sn+1(q y)sn+1 would satisfy this requirement.
Consider now the following sets:
Hsn+1(q)  fz 2 
 : z  sn+1 = q  sn+1g (25)
Y  fw 2 Rn : w = ((z   q)  s1; :::; (z   q)  sn) or w = ( (z   q)  s1; :::; (z   q)  sn) (26)
for some z 2 Hsn+1(q)g
(27)
Y 0  fw 2 Rn : w  0g (28)
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Clearly, Y and Y 0 are closed and convex. We will show next that Y \ int(Y 0) = ?. Thus,
we want to show that if z  sn+1 = q  sn+1 then it cannot be that z  si < q  si for all
i 2 f1; :::; ng or z  si > q  si for all i 2 f1; :::; ng. We can assume that si 6=  sn+1 because
otherwise we would be done with the proof of the lemma, so what remains to prove is that
Hsn+1(q)\ (\ni=1Lsi(q)) = ? and Hsn+1(q)\ (\ni=1Usi(q)) = ?. The rst claim follows from
the results we obtained above. Thus, note that if this were not true, that is if there exists
x 2 Hsn+1(q)\ (\ni=1Lsi(q)); since \ni=1Lsi(q) is open, we could take a su¢ ciently small  > 0
such that N(x)  \ni=1Lsi(q). Since x 2 Hsn+1(q), we have that x+(1 )y 2 N(x) \Lsn+1(q)
for some y 2 Lsn+1(q) and some  su¢ ciently small and we would thus obtain a contradiction
with the fact that Lsn+1(q) \ (\ni=1Lsi(q)) = ?. As for the second part of the claim, note that
if there exists x 2 Hsn+1(q)\ (\ni=1Usi(q)) we would have x  si > q  si for all i 2 f1; :::; ng and
x  sn+1 = q  sn+1. Consider then the element x0 = q + (q   x) for some  > 0. We will then
have x0  si < q  si for all i  n and x0  sn+1 = q  sn+1 so x0 2 Hsn+1(q)\ (\ni=1Lsi(q)) which we
know that cannot hold by the rst part of the claim and thus we are done.
Given that Y and Y 0 are closed and convex and Y \ int(Y 0) = ? we can use the Separating
Hyperplane Theorem to obtain that there exists a vector  2 Rnnf0g and a number k 2 R
such that such that   w  k for all w 2 Y and   w  k for all w 2 Y 0. But since
((q  q)  s1; :::; (q  q)  sn) 2 Y \ Y 0 we must have k =   0 = 0. Also, note that for any w 2 Y
we have w 2 Y so w  0 and ( w)  0 so w = 0. Moreover, note that since w  k = 0
for all w 2 Y 0 we must have   0. Therefore, we obtained that for any z 2 Hsn+1(q), that is
for any z 2 
 with (z   q)  sn+1 = 0 we must have: (z   q)  (1s1 + ::: + nsn) = 0. Then,
denoting as above by si the elements of RN 1 consisting of the rst N   1 coordinates of si
and using for instance Theorem 5.81 from Aliprantis and Border (1999, pp. 207), we have that
sn+1 =  (1s1 + ::: + nsn) for some  2 R and then sn+1 =  (1s1 + ::: + nsn). From the
fact that sn+1 2 PNnf0g it follows that  6= 0. Since (\ni=1Lsi(q)) \ Lsn+1(q) = ? we must
also have  < 0 so sn+1 =
Pn
i=1 isi with i   i  0 and the proof of the Lemma 24 is
complete. 
Lemma 25 \N 1i=1 Lsi(B) 6= ?.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction. Clearly, we have Ls1(B) 6= ? so assume that
\ni=1Lsi(B) 6= ? and by contradiction that \n+1i=1 Lsi(B) = ?. By Lemma 24, it would follow that
sn+1 2 cone(f s1; :::; sng) so sn+1 =
Pn
i=1 i( si) with i  0. But then, sn+1+
Pn
i=1 isi = 0
which contradicts the fact that fs1; :::; sn+1g are linearly independent. Therefore, we must have
\n+1i=1 Lsi(B) 6= ? and this completes the induction proof. 
Lemma 26 There exists a set bS5  bS3 with (bS5) > 0 and z0 2 
 such that z0 2 U s(B) \ \s2bS5Ls(B).
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Proof. Since \N 1i=1 Lsi(B) 6= ? by Lemma 25 and  s =2 cone(fs1; :::; sN 1g) which implies
immediately that s =2 cone(f s1; :::; sN 1g) we can use Lemma 24 to conclude that: Ls(B)\ \N 1i=1 Lsi(B) 6= ?But since Ls(B) = fy 2 
 : y  s < z  s for all z 2 Bg = fy 2 
 :
y  ( s) > z  ( s) for all z 2 Bg = U s(B) it follows that U s(B) \ (\N 1i=1 Lsi(B)) 6= ?.
So we can take some: z0 2 U s(B) \ (\N 1i=1 Lsi(B)). Moreover, since z0 2 \N 1i=1 Lsi(B) it
follows that: z0 2 \s2cone(fs1;:::;sN 1g)Ls(B). To see this, note rstly that z0  si < x  si for all
x 2 B and for each i. Take some s = PN 1i=1 isi with i  0 for all i. Then for any x 2 B
we will have z0  s = PN 1i=1 i(z0  si ) < PN 1i=1 i(x  si ) = x  s so that z0 2 Ls(B). Now,
denote by: bS5  cone(fs1; :::; sN 1g) \ bS3. Since z0 2 U s(B) \  \s2cone(fs1;:::;sN 1g)Ls(B)
 U s(B)\
 \s2bS5Ls(B) and bS5  bS3 with (bS5) > 0 by Lemma 23, the proof of the Lemma
26 is complete. 
Lemma 27 There exists a lottery z 2 (Z) such that for all s 2 bS5 we have B(s) > fzg(s)
and B( s) < fzg( s).
Proof. Since B is compact we have U s(B) = U s(fz00g) for some z00 2 B. Since B 
int((Z)) we have z00 2 int((Z)) so there exists: z  z00 + (1   )z0 2 int((Z) for some
su¢ ciently high  < 1. Since z0 2 U s(B) we will have B( s) < z0  ( s). On the other
hand, by choice of z00 we have z00  ( s)  x ( s) for all x 2 B so z00  ( s)  B( s).
Therefore: fzg( s) = z00  ( s) + (1   )z0  ( s) > B( s). Finally, for any s 2 bS5 we
have B(s)  z00 s while z0 2 Ls(B) implies B(s) > z0 s. Thus, B(s) > z00 s+(1 )z0 s =
z  s = fzg(s) and the proof of the lemma is complete. 
We will complete now the proof of Theorem 16. Thus, consider the sets A [ fzg and
B [ fzg and we want to show that we must have: W (hull(B[fzg)) > W (hull(A[fzg)) which
would be su¢ cient to exclude the case when (f sg) = 0. To see this, note that B  B0
implies W (hull(B0[fzg))  W (hull(B[fzg)) so we found z 2 (Z) with fzg( s)  B( s)
and W (hull(B0[fzg)) > W (hull(A[fzg)). This contradicts Axiom CEB-2 because B0 was chosen
arbitrarily from those sets satisfying the requirements of the axiom. Thus, we have:
W (hull(B[fzg)) =
Z
SNnbS5(B _ fzg)(s)(ds) +
Z
bS5(B _ fzg)(s)(ds) 

Z
SNnbS5(A _ fzg)(s)(ds) +
Z
bS5(B _ fzg)(s)(ds) >
>
Z
SNnbS5(A _ fzg)(s)(ds) +
Z
bS5(A _ fzg)(s)(ds) =W (hull(A[fzg))
where the weak inequality comes from the fact that A  B so B(s)  A(s) for all s. The
strict inequality comes from the fact that for any s 2 bS5  bS3 with (bS5) > 0 we have
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B(s) > fzg(s) and B(s) > A(s) so that (B _fzg)(s) > (A_fzg)(s). Therefore, we must
have: (f sg) > 0 and thus the proof of Theorem 16 is complete. 
Theorem 28 Under axioms CEB and Identication there exists " > 0 such that (N"( s)nf sg) =
0.
Proof. Most steps in the proof of this theorem are identical to steps from the proof of the
previous theorem so we will present in detail only the step at which the two proofs di¤er.
Assume Axiom CEB is satised and by contradiction that the statement of Theorem 28 is
false. Thus, for any " > 0 we have (N"( s)nf sg) > 0. Repeat the steps from Lemmas 17-
18 in the proof of Theorem 16 to construct the open set bS1  SN with (bS1) > 0 and  s 2 bS1
such that B(s) > A(s) for any s 2 bS1. We will next show that the result from Lemma 19
is true in this case as well.23 Then, the rest of the proof will go through as above and thus
we would conclude that Axiom CEB-2 is violated which would constitute the contradiction.
We have  s 2 bS1 and we claim that there exists " > 0 such that bS1ncone(N "( s)) > 0
where N "( s) is the closed ball of radius " around  s in RN . If this were not true we
would then have 
bS1nconeN 1
n
( s)

= 0 for all n  1. Note that
nbS1nconeN 1
n
( s)
o
is an increasing sequence of sets with [1n=1
bS1nconeN 1
n
( s)

= bS1ncone(f sg). ButbS1ncone(f sg) = bS1n f sg because cone(f sg)\ bS1 = f sg as argued in the proof of the
Lemma 19 from Theorem 16. So, we can use Theorem 9.8(i) in Aliprantis and Border (1999,
pp. 337) to conclude that: (bS1nf sg) = lim
n!1

bS1nconeN 1
n
( s)

= 0. Since  s 2 bS1
and bS1 is open, there must exist an open neighborhood N( s) of  s included in bS1 such that
(N( s)nf sg) = 0 which would contradict our assumption. Therefore, there must exist
some " > 0 such that 
bS1ncone(N "( s)) > 0 which completes the proof of the Theorem
28. 
We complete now the proof of the su¢ ciency of the Axioms. Using (21) for any A 2eK((Z)), we can write:
W (A) =
Z
SNnf sg

max
x2A
(x  s)

(ds) + max
x2A
(x  ( s))(f sg): (29)
In particular, for A = fzg we will have:
W (fzg) =
Z
SNnf sg
(z  s)(ds) + (z  ( s))(f sg): (30)
23Note that it is the proof of Lemma 19 where we used the contradiction assumption that (f sg) = 0 in
the proof of Theorem 16.
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But as shown above,W (fzg) = v(z) = (zs) so we have: zs = 1+(f sg)
Z
SNnf sg
(zs)(ds)
so using (29) we get:
W (A) =
Z
SNnf sg

max
x2A
(x  s)

(ds) + max
z2A

  (f sg)
+ (f sg)
Z
SNnf sg
(z  s)(ds)

(31)
In conclusion, since W (A) = V (A) and A  hull(A), for any A 2 K((Z)) we get the
desired normalized reference-dependent representation:
V (A) =
Z
S

max
x2A
(x  s)
 e(ds)  min
z2A
Z
S
(z  s)e(ds) (32)
where   (f sg)
+(f sg) , S  SNnN"( s) and e(ds)  (ds)(SN ) (f sg) for s 6=  s and e(f sg) 
0. Note that since (f sg) > 0 by Theorem 16 and  > 0 we will have  2 (0; 1). Also, since we
have (N"( s)nf sg) = 0 by Lemma 28 it follows that: e(N"( s)) = e(N"( s)nf sg) +e(f sg) = (N"( s)nf sg)(SN ) (f sg) = 0 and thus condition (iii) from Denition 9 is also satised. This
completes the su¢ ciency part of the proof of Theorem 13. 
Proof of Necessity in Theorem 13:
We show next that the a preference relation which can be represented by a utility function as in
(8) must satisfy Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Axiom
CEB-2. The fact that the preference will satisfy the rst three of the axioms is true because
the representation in (8) is just a particular form of a DLR representation which implies those
axioms. Also, given the equivalent representation in (2) it is clear that the preference must also
satisfy Monotonicity and it is straightforward to show the necessity of Axiom CEB. Therefore,
it remains to show that Axiom CEB-2 must also be satised.
The following lemma will constitute the main step of the argument. Note rstly that by
part (iii) of the representation in (8), there exists " > 0 such that (N"( s)) = 0.
Lemma 29 When the preferences  admit a normalized reference-dependent representation
as in (8), there exist a compact set A0  int((Z)) and a lottery y 2 int((Z)) such that
fyg( s) > A0( s) and A0(s) > fyg(s) for all s 2 SNnN"( s).
Proof. Firstly, since  s =2 SNncone(N"( s)) we can use an argument similar to the one
from the proof of Lemma 20 from Theorem 16 to cover SNnN"( s) with 2N 2 elements
fS1; :::; S2N 2g such that  s =2 cone(Sj) for any j. By taking their closures, we can assume that
32
the elements are all closed sets. Then, using the approach from Lemma 21, we can partition
each Sj to obtain a cover of SNnN"( s) with elements indexed by a nite set J , such that
diam(Sj)   for some  < 12 and all j 2 J . Again, by taking closures we can assume that Sj are
closed for all j. Next, as in Lemma 22 we can show that for each j 2 J there exists j > 0 such
that for each j we have  s =2 cone([s2SjN j(s)). Thus, as in Lemma 23 we can nd a cover
of Sj with a nite family of sets of the form fint(cone(fs1;i; :::; sN 1;ig)) \ Sjgi2Ij such that for
any i 2 Ij, fs1;i; :::; sN 1;ig are linearly independent and  s =2 int(cone(fs1;i; :::; sN 1;ig)). Let
j(i) be the index j such that i 2 Ij and let I  [j2JIj. Note that by construction, I is a nite
set. Take some arbitrary lottery y 2 int((Z)).
For each i 2 I, since fs1;i; :::; sN;ig are linearly independent we can employ Lemma 24
as in the proof of Lemma 25 from Theorem 16 to conclude that \N 1k=1 Lsk;i(y) 6= ? and
then immediately that \N 1j=1 L sk;i(y) 6= ?. Therefore, using again Lemma 24 for the set
f s1;i; :::; sN 1;ig and s we will have that
 \N 1k=1 L sk;i(y)\L s(y) 6= ? so  \N 1k=1 Usk;i(y)\
L s(y) 6= ? because L sk;i(y) = Usk;i(y). Now, for each i 2 I, take x0i 2
 \N 1k=1 Usk;i(y) \
L s(y) and note that by an argument similar to the one from Lemma 26 we will have: x
0
i 2
\s2int(cone(fs1;i;:::;sN 1;ig))\Sj(i)\(SNnN" ( s))Us(y)

\L s(y). Since x0i as chosen above is not nec-
essarily in (Z) consider the set fx0i+(1 )y :  2 (0; 1)g and note that since y 2 int((Z))
which is algebraically open, for a small enough  we will have xi  x0i+(1 )y 2 int((Z)).
In addition, since (x0i+(1 )y)s  y s when x0i s  y s and (x0i+(1 )y)( s) < y ( s)
when x0i ( s) < y ( s) it follows that xi 2

\s2int(cone(fs1;i;:::;sN 1;ig))\Sj(i)\(SNnN" ( s))Us(y)

\
L s(y) \ int((Z)). Let A0  [i2Ixi. Firstly, note that since xi 2 L s(y) for each i we have
xi  ( s) < y  ( s)) sup
i2I
(xi  ( s)) = max
i2I
(xi  ( s)) < y  ( s) so fyg( s) > A0( s).
On the other hand, the family fint(fcone(fs1;i; :::; sN 1;ig))\Sj(i) \
 
SNnN"( s)
gi2I being a
cover of SNnN"( s), for any s 2 SNnN"( s) we will have s 2 int(cone(fs1;i; :::; sN 1;ig))\Sj(i)
for some i 2 I. Therefore, A0(s)  fxig(s) > fyg(s) which completes the proof of the Lemma
29. 
Let A  hull(A0) and B  hull(A[ y), where A0 and y are given by the Lemma 29
and we will show that A and B thus dened will satisfy the conditions of Axiom CEB-2
from Appendix B which we already proved that is equivalent to Axiom CEB-2. Firstly, since
fyg( s) > A0( s) it follows that:
B( s) = A[fyg( s) = A( s)_ fyg( s) = A0( s)_ fyg( s) > A0( s) = A( s)
(33)
where we employed repeatedly the fact that C() = hull(C)(). Using similar steps and the
monotonicity of ()(s), it can be shown that A0(s) > fyg(s) implies A(s) = B(s) for
s 2 SNnN"( s). Secondly, we want to show that for any lottery z 2 (Z) with fzg( s) 
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B( s), we have W (hull(B[fzg)) =W (hull(A[fzg)).
For C 2 fA;Bg we have
W (hull(C[fzg)) =
Z
SNnN" ( s)
hull(C[fzg)(s)(ds) +
Z
N"( s)
hull(C[fzg)(s)(ds) (34)
Since (N"( s)) = 0 and jhull(C[fzg)(s)j  j(Z)(s)j <1 because (Z) is compact, we have
W (hull(C[fzg)) =
Z
SNnN" ( s)
hull(C[fzg)(s)(ds). On the other hand,
Z
SNnN" ( s)
hull(A[fzg)(s)(ds) =
Z
SNnN" ( s)
hull(B[fzg)(s)(ds) (35)
because A(s) = B(s) for s 2 SNnN"( s). Thus, we have W (hull(B[fzg)) = W (hull(A[fzg))
as desired. Finally, note that standard results guarantee that A and B are compact sets since
A0 is nite and A[ y is compact.
This completes the proof of the necessity of the axioms for the representation. We mention
here that this slightly elaborate construction of the set A is necessary. Thus, note that it would
have not been enough to select a lottery xs 2 Us(y) \ L s(y) for each s 2 SNnN"( s)
appealing to the Axiom of Choice and then dene A  cl  [s2SNnN" ( s)xs. This is be-
cause xs 2 L s(y) for all s 2 SNnN"( s) would not necessarily imply sup
x2A
(x  ( s)) <
y  ( s) as needed in order to show the required condition that fyg( s) > A( s). On
the other hand, \s2SNnN" ( s)Us(y) is in general not necessarily nonempty so we cannot just
take an element in the intersection of this set with L s(y) and let A be that element. An
alternative approach would be to take some element y0 2 L s(y) \ int((Z)) and then
to try take elements xs 2 Us(y) \ L s(y0) with the aim of obtaining the strict condition
fyg( s) > fy0g( s)  A( s). However, this approach also runs into problems because
even though Us(y)\L s(y0) 6= ? we cannot insure in general that Us(y)\L s(y0)\(Z) 6= ?
as necessary to obtain A  (Z). 
A3. Proof of Theorem 15
Since the preferences  satisfy Weak Order, Independence and Continuity, Theorem 2 in DLR
(2001) shows that the function that represents these preferences must be unique up to an
a¢ ne transformation. Thus, if Vi(A) =
Z
S

max
z2A
(z  s)

i(ds) imin
x2A
Z
S
(x  s)i(ds)

are two
normalized reference-dependent representations of , then V1 = V2 +  for some  > 0 and
 2 R. If vi(z)  Vi(fzg) are the corresponding restrictions to the singletons, we must have
v1 = v2 + . As argued in Appendix A1, for each i 2 f1; 2g there exists si 2 SN and i  0
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such that vi(z) = i(z  si) for all z 2 (Z). Moreover, as argued in Appendix A2, we must
have i > 0. Therefore, for any z 2 (Z) we have 1(z  s1) = 2(z  s2) + . Because of the
normalization
PN
k=1 s
k = 0 in SN , if we take z = ( 1
N
; :::; 1
N
) 2 (Z) we have z si = 0. Thus,
1(z
  s1) = 2(z  s2) +  implies  = 0.
Therefore, z  (1s1) = z  (2s2) for any z 2 (Z) which in turn implies that 1s1 = 2s2.
To see this, for each k 2 f1; :::; Ng take zk = (0; :::; 0; 1; 0; :::; 0) 2 (Z) with the 1 on kth
position and note that zk  (1s1) = zk  (2s2) implies (1s1)k = (2s2)k where by (w)k we
denote the kth coordinate of a nite dimensional vector w. Thus, s1 is an a¢ ne transformation
of s2 which immediately implies that s
1
 = s
2
, because s
i
 2 SN for i 2 f1; 2g and we know that
SN contains the unique normalization of any a¢ ne function. On the other hand, as shown in
Appendix A for any A 2 eK((Z)) we have Vi(A) = Wi(A) = Z
SN
A(s)i(ds) where i is
the measure from the DLR representation. Since V1(A) = V2(A) we have
Z
SN
A(s)1(ds) =Z
SN
A(s)(2)(ds) and then Lemma 18 in Sarver (2008) shows that this implies that 1 = 2.
But 1 and 2 are both normalized to be probability measures so it must be that  = 1 and
then 1 = 2. Finally,  = 1 together with 1s
1
 = 2s
2
 and s
1
 = s
2
 imply 1 = 2.
Now, recall that at the end of the su¢ ciency part of the proof of Theorem 13 we used
the elements of the DLR representation to dene the elements of our normalized reference-
dependent representation. More specically, with a slight abuse of notation we have i 
i(f sig)
i+i(f sig) and ei(ds)  i(ds)i(SN ) i(f sig) for i 2 f1; 2g. Since s1 = s2, 1 = 2 and 1 = 2 it
follows that 1 = 2 and e1 = e2 which completes the proof of Theorem 15. 
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